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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Ms. Anderes appeals from the district court's Judgment and Commitment. 
Ms. Anderes was found guilty of battery upon a probation officer after a jury trial. She 
asserts that the prosecution committed misconduct when it repeatedly called her a liar 
and vouched for the credibility of the State's witnesses during closing arguments. The 
prosecutorial misconduct was not objected to; however, Ms. Anderes asserts that the 
misconduct amounted to fundamental error, that it was not harmless, and that her felony 
conviction must be overturned. 
Furthermore, Ms. Anderes asserts that the district court abused its discretion in 
ordering restitution for the entirety of the alleged victim's shoulder surgery because the 
surgery not only repaired damage from the alleged battery, but also treated joint/bone 
issues not related to the battery. She also asserts that the district court abused its 
discretion in ordering her to pay for the replacement of a pair of sunglasses because 
insufficient evidence was supplied to prove that Ms. Anderes' criminal actions resulted 
in the need for the replacement of the sunglasses. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On May 24, 2012, an Information was filed charging Ms. Anderes with felony, 
battery on a probation officer; misdemeanor, possession of a controlled substance; and 
misdemeanor, possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.33-34.) In June, an 
Information Part II was filed charging Ms. Anderes with being a persistent violator. 
(R., pp.47-48.) The Information was later amended to include a second count of 
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possession of a controlled substance. (R., pp.125-127.) The case 
to trial. (R., pp.159-177, 182-188.) 
At trial, the State presented the testimony of several people who were working at 
the parole and probation office on the day of the alleged battery: Christine Barrera did 
not see the altercation, but witnessed Officer Kightlinger's injuries and observed 
Ms. Anderes afterward. (See generally Tr., p.187, L.1 - p.209, L.24.) Tara Richardson 
heard a thump outside of her office and came out to find Officer Kightlinger on top of 
Ms. Anderes, saw the two were struggling, went to get help, returned to see the struggle 
continue. (See generally Tr., p.496, L.13 p.51'1, L.7.) 
Robert Kightlinger, the alleged victim, testified that he was watching Ms. Anderes 
for her parole officer; that she gathered her things; he told her to leave them in the chair, 
face the wall, and put her hands behind her back; she complied for a moment, then 
turned, grabbed her things and charged at him. (Tr., p.391, L.17 - p.393, L.7.) He 
stated that Ms. Anderes sprinted toward him, put her head down and ran into his chest, 
spinning him out into the hall. (Tr., p.395, Ls.1-23.) He then began struggling with her 
to get her into custody, moving against a wall and falling to the ground. (Tr., p.396, 
Ls.1-23.) While Ms. Anderes continued to struggle, Mr. Kightlinger was able to get them 
back on their feet. (Tr., p.398, Ls.1-22.) He then dropped her to the ground and 
dropped his weight on Ms. Anderes. (Tr., p .399, Ls.1-19.) At that point, Ms. Anderes 
became still and other officers arrived to assist. (Tr., p.399, L.24 - p.400, L.6.) 
Ms. Anderes then testified that she placed her items on the ground as requested 
and then she started to put her hands behind her back, but then changed her mind, 
scooped up her belongings and ran towards the door. (Tr., p.570, L.14 - p.574, L.9.) 
At this time, Officer Kightlinger was parallel with her backing up toward the door, saying 
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"Whoa, Whoa, Whoa." (Tr., p.574, ) She that she did not run into Officer 
Kightlinger, that he was running along her, when she almost got out the door, the 
officer grabbed her and tackled her to the ground. (Tr., p.576, L.5 - p.577, L.16.) The 
two got back to their feet and then he dropped her to the ground again. (Tr., p.580, 
Ls.14-25.) During her testimony, Ms. Anderes also admitted possessing spice, a 
controlled substance, and drug paraphernalia. (Tr., p.617, L.13 p.618, L.1.) 
On rebuttal, the State presented the testimony of additional people who were 
working at parole and probation on the date of the incident: Christopher Phillips testified 
that he responded to a call for help, found Officer Kightlinger on the ground on top of 
Ms. Anderes who was "laying on the ground" and struggling a little bit, "not much." 
(Tr., p.631, L.14 - p.632, L.10.) Elias Martinez testified that when he came upon Officer 
Kightlinger and Ms. Anderes they were on the floor and Ms. Anderes was struggling, 
kicking, and flopping, so he restrained her legs. (Tr., p.650, L.4 - p.651, L.10.) 
The jury found Ms. Anderes guilty of all of the charges. (R., pp.228-229.) She 
entered a guilty plea to the persistent violator enhancement. (Tr., p.790, L.7 - p.791, 
L.8.) 
The district court sentenced Ms. Anderes to a unified sentence of twenty years, 
with five years fixed, for the battery upon a probation officer, enhanced by the persistent 
violator enhancement, and one year fixed each for the possession of a controlled 
substance and possession of paraphernalia convictions. (R., pp.282-285.) 
Ms. Anderes filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the Judgment and Conviction. 
(R., pp.292-296.) Following a hearing, the district court issued an Order for Restitution 
and Judgment ordering Ms. Anderes to pay $41,537.98 in restitution. (R., pp.306-307.) 
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also filed a timely Rule 35 motion for reduction of 
The motion was denied. (R., pp.336-339.) 
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(R., pp.328-
ISSUES 
1. Did the state violate Ms. Anderes' right to a fair trial by committing prosecutorial 
misconduct? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it ordered restitution for a portion 
of Mr. Kightlinger's surgery which repaired damage that was not proven to have 
been caused by Ms. Anderes and in ordering restitution for a pair of sunglasses 
that the State failed to prove were damaged or destroyed as a result of 
Ms. Anderes' criminal actions? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The State Violated Ms. Anderes' Right To A Fair Trial By Committing Prosecutorial 
Misconduct 
A. Introduction 
Ms. Anderes asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct in her case which 
requires the vacation of her conviction. The prosecution committed misconduct which 
rises to the level of fundamental error because the misconduct was related to one or 
more of Ms. Anderes constitutional rights and was so egregious that it may have 
contributed to the jury's verdicts. The unfairness created by the prosecutor's 
misconduct resulted in Ms. Anderes being denied due process of law and was in 
violation of her right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution, and Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution. The 
violations occurred when the prosecutor repeatedly made statements during closing 
arguments vouching for prosecutorial witnesses and calling Ms. Anderes a liar. 
Although defense counsel did not object to these instances of misconduct, Ms. Anderes 
asserts that the prosecutorial misconduct amounted to fundamental error, was not 
harmless and, as such, this Court should vacate her conviction for battery on a 
probation officer. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Because Ms. Anderes' prosecutorial misconduct claims are grounded in 
constitutional principles, they involve questions of law over which this Court exercises 
free review. City of Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 2 (2006). Trial error ordinarily will not 
be addressed on appeal unless a timely objection was made in the trial court. State v. 
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147 Idaho 857, 861 (Ct. App. 2009). On appeal, Ms. Anderes raises instances 
of un-objected to misconduct. Because these claims of error are raised for the first time 
on appeal, Ms. Anderes must establish that the errors are reviewable as "fundamental 
error." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222 (2010). The Idaho Supreme Court recently 
revisited fundamental error and stated that to obtain relief on appeal for fundamental 
error: 
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the defendant's 
unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the error must be clear or 
obvious, without the need for any additional information not contained in 
the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to 
object was a tactical decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate 
that the error affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning (in most 
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings. 
Id. (footnote omitted). Thus, on a claim of fundamental error, a defendant must first 
show that the alleged error "violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived 
constitutional rights," and that the error "plainly exists" in that the error was plain, clear, 
or obvious. Id. at 228. If the alleged error satisfies the first two elements of the Perry 
test, the error is reviewable. Id. To obtain appellate relief, however, the defendant must 
further persuade the reviewing court that the error was not harmless, i.e., that there is a 
reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the trial. Id. at 226-228. 
C. The State Violated Ms. Anderes' Right To A Fair Trial By Committing 
Prosecutorial Misconduct 
"[l]t [is] the duty of the Government to establish ... guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. This notion-basic in our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free society-is a 
requirement and a safeguard of due process of law in the historic, procedural content of 
'due process."' Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802-803 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting). The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that, "[n]o 
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shall .. deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " 
U . CONST. amend. V. Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment states, "[n]o state 
shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Additionally, the Idaho Constitution also guarantees that, 
"[n]o person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." 
lo. CONST. art. I, § 13. Due process requires criminal trials to be fundamentally fair. 
Schwartzmil/er v. Winters, 99 Idaho 18, 19 (1978). Prosecutorial misconduct may so 
unfairly contaminate the trial as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due 
process. State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 318 (Ct. App. 2005); Greer v. Miller, 483 
U . 756, 765 (1987). In order to constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial 
misconduct must be of sufficient consequence to result in the denial of the defendant's 
right to a fair trial. Id. The hallmark of due process analysis in cases of alleged 
prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor. 
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982). The aim of due process is not the 
punishment of society for the misdeeds of the prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial 
to the accused. Id. 
1. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Encroaching Upon The Jury's 
Function To Make Credibility Determinations When It Repeatedly Referred 
To Ms. Anderes As A Liar And Vouched For The Credibility Of The State's 
Witnesses 
Closing argument "serves to sharpen and clarify the issues for resolution by the 
trier of fact in a criminal case." State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App. 2007) 
(quoting Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975)). Its purpose "is to enlighten 
the jury and to help the jurors remember and interpret the evidence." Id. (quoting 
State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 450 (Ct. App. 1991 )). "Both sides have traditionally 
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afforded considerable latitude in closing argument to the jury and are entitled to 
discuss fully, from their respective standpoints, the evidence and the inferences to be 
drawn therefrom." Id. (quoting State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280 (2003)). 
However, considerable latitude has its limits, both in matters expressly stated and those 
implied. Id. 
Prosecutors too often forget that they are a part of the machinery of the court, 
and that they occupy an official position, which necessarily leads jurors to give more 
credence to their statements, action, and conduct in the course of the trial and in the 
presence of the jury than they will give to counsel for the accused. State v. Irwin, 9 
Idaho 35, _, 71 P. 608, 610 (1903). The prosecutor's duty is to see that the 
defendant has a fair trial by presenting only competent evidence and should avoid 
presenting evidence to prejudice the minds of the jury. Id. The prosecutor must refrain 
from deceiving the jury by use of inappropriate inferences. Id. 
In the case at hand, the prosecution asked the jury to make a decision based 
upon her belief that Ms. Anderes was a liar and that the prosecution witnesses were 
truthful. The prosecution's statements went much further than the permissible bounds 
allowed to encourage a jury to question the credibility of witnesses. 
Closing argument should not include the prosecutor's personal opinions and 
beliefs about the credibility of a witness or inflammatory words employed in describing 
the defendant. Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86. Generally, it may be improper to label the 
defendant as a "liar," for testimony given in his or her defense. See State v. Kuhn, 139 
Idaho 710, 716 (Ct. App. 2003). Even when the defendant admitted to lying in 
connection with the case, excessive labeling of the defendant as a "liar" could be 
g 
as an 
before the jury. 
attempt to obtain a finding of guilt by disparaging the defendant 
v. Gross, 146 Idaho 1 19 (Ct. App. 2008). 
In Love/ass, the prosecutor informed the jury in closing argument that Lovelass 
had committed "full-fledged perjury," that Lovelass had lied on more than one occasion, 
and everything he said to the jury was fabricated. State v. Love/ass, 133 Idaho 160, 
169 (Ct. App. 1999). The Love/ass Court stated that in closing argument, "both the 
prosecutor and defense counsel are entitled to discuss fully, from their respective 
standpoints, the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom," and that this 
includes "the right to identify how, from the party's perspective, the evidence confirms or 
calls into doubt the credibility of particular witnesses." Id. at 168 (citation omitted). 
However, "it is improper for a prosecutor to express a personal belief or opinion 
regarding the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or as to the guilt of the 
defendant." Id. (citation omitted). The Court of Appeals held that the comments did not 
constitute fundamental error as they appeared to have fallen within the broad range of 
fair comment on the evidence rather than an expression of the prosecutor's personal 
belief, but also recognized that the prosecutor's comments were troubling and less than 
artful. Id. at 169. 
In State v. Garcia, 100 Idaho 108 (1979), the Idaho Supreme Court found that 
the prosecutor's comments that, "Mr. Garcia has been caught in this rather apparent 
contradiction, the lie, he didn't have the beer pitcher," and, "I don't believe Mr. Garcia's 
story, too many coincidences, too many slips and slides around the facts," constituted 
fundamental error, but that the error was harmless. Id. at 110-11. The Garcia Court 
held that it was error for the prosecutor to express a personal belief or opinion as to the 
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truth or falsity of the testimony, but in light of the overwhelming and 
conclusive evidence against Garcia, the error was harmless. Id. at 111. 
In Williams v. State, 803 A.2d 927 (Del. Supr. 2002), reversible error was found 
due to the prosecutor's continued characterization of the defendant as a liar. The court 
found these improper comments as inflammatory, patently improper, and "so clearly 
impermissible that the trial judge had the duty to intervene, notwithstanding the absence 
of an objection by defense counsel." Id. at 930-31 (citations omitted). The Williams 
Court cautioned that the word '"liar' is an epithet to be used sparingly in argument to the 
jury."' Id. at 930; see also People v. Skinner, 747 N.Y.S.2d 857, 858-59 (N.Y.A.D. 3rd 
Dept. 2002) (holding that even though trial counsel failed to object, reversal was 
\A/arranted where, during closing argument, the prosecutor "made at least a dozen direct 
references to defendant being a liar, made other references to defendants 'false' and/or 
'tailored story,"' and characterized the defendant's experts as his puppet, because such 
prosecutorial misconduct "was so flagrant and pervasive as to compel the conclusion 
that defendant was deprived of a fair trial.") (citations omitted.) 
One way a prosecutor can commit misconduct is by vouching during his closing 
arguments for the credibility of the evidence he presented. State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 
364, 368 (Ct. App. 2010). A prosecutor improperly vouches for evidence when he puts 
the prestige of the state behind that evidence, expressing his personal opinions or 
beliefs about the quality of that evidence. Id. 
Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4 provides, "A lawyer shall not ... in trial ... 
state a personal opinion as to ... the credibility of a witness ... or the guilt or innocence 
of an accused." The rule applies to both the prosecuting attorney and to defense 
counsel. State v. Carson, 151 Idaho 713, 721 (2011 ). With respect to due process, the 
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u State's Supreme Court has explained why prosecutor cannot vouch for a 
credibility or express a personal opinion of the defendant's guilt stating: 
The prosecutor's vouching for the credibility of witnesses and expressing 
his personal opinion concerning the guilt of the accused pose two 
dangers: such comments can convey the impression that evidence not 
presented to the jury, but known to the prosecutor, supports the charges 
against the defendant and can thus jeopardize the defendant's right to be 
tried solely on the basis of the evidence presented to the jury; and the 
prosecutor's opinion carries with it the imprimatur of the Government and 
may induce the jury to trust the Government's judgment rather than its 
own view of the evidence. 
Id. (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1985)). 
In the case at hand, the State vouched for the credibility of its witnesses and 
referred to Ms. Anderes as a liar numerous times during closing arguments. The 
prosecutor began dealing with credibility by correctly discussing the jury instruction 
telling the jury it was up to them to determine credibility, but immediately began to 
suggest that Ms. Anderes was not truthful and imply that the jury could disregard only 
her testimony because it should fully accept the testimony of the State's witnesses: 
Testimony is evidence, and the instructions tell you that the weight 
to be given to certain evidence is up for you to decide, which means you 
can decide to give no weight at all to hers. You can look at her credibility 
and you can figure out whether you even consider her story, as she calls 
it. And if you find that she's not credible, you don't have to weigh it equally 
with the testimony of more credible witnesses. 
(Tr., p.751, Ls.12-19.) Admittedly, the prosecutor begins most of her credibility-related 
statement with proper arguments discussing the evidence and conclusions that could be 
drawn from the evidence. However, Ms. Anderes asserts that the prosecution crossed 
the line by immediately following these proper comments with impermissible statements 
inserting her personal view of the evidence, including repeatedly offering her opinion 
that Ms. Anderes is lying. This tactic was used over and over again throughout the 
closing arguments: 
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when you consider her credibility, you know that she's lied to 
you about how that second handcuff went on. You have three people. 
Chris Phillips can't even remember these other people's names. He's not 
going to come up here and tell you anything that isn't true for a bunch of 
people he can't even recall well enough to give you their name. 
very credible, and the others who tell you that are as well. 
She has lied to you being moved into that room. 
what purpose that is, I don't know. But she wanted it to be very clear 
that she disagrees with Christine Barrera and Eli Martinez about being 
moved into that room. They are sufficiently credible that you can 
define that as not being truthful. She lies about kicking and struggling. 
There are four sets of eyes that tell you that she continued to struggle: 
Officer Kightlinger's, Tara Richardson's, Officer Martinez and Chris 
Phillips. 
We talk about a burglary conviction during her cross-examination. 
She was also using controlled substances. Maybe some of those aren't 
lies. Maybe she can't remember very well some of these details, but she is 
not credible, and, again, she's the one who's charged with a crime here 
and has a lot at stake. 
(Tr., p.753, L.9 - p.754, L.8 (emphasis added).) 
is Robert Kightlinger credible? Absolutely. You've got 
corroboration for many of the things that he says. He's the only set of 
eyes on her for some of the other things that he points out, but he is 
credible. He is corroborated in many details. The manner in which he 
testified was very credible. . .. His non-verbals were very credible. 
We talked about that in voir dire. His version of events make sense. 
There's logic that supports it as well, and he has no motive to be 
untruthful. He has no bias. He's never even known her before that day, 
so for what possible reason would there be for him to make up this story. 
Very credible. 
Now, if you believe Eli Martinez, Tara Richardson and Chris 
Phillips, you can convict the defendant even if you don't believe Robert 
Kightlinger. They see enough, they hear enough, they know enough, 
really, to substantiate this charge even if you didn't have Officer 
Kightlinger's testimony, but you do and he is a credible witness. 
(Tr., p.755, L.12- p.756, L.10 (emphasis added).) 
The prosecution theme of vouching continued in rebuttal closing: 
Mr. Smith is a gifted storyteller, the likes of Mark Twain. 
Unfortunately, in this context, the story is only helpful if it's based on 
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he bases his on Ms. Anderes' 
credible and not what has happened. 
, p.774, 15-19.) 
which is 
And, ultimately, counsel talks about the credibility of probation and 
parole officers. He tries to imply that this isn't how it happened; that 
Ms. Anderes' version is accurate. Why, if you are a professional probation 
and parole officer would you want to admit that you got beaten up by her, 
instead of saying you fell down at work? What bias does he have to make 
this up? What motive does he have to say she did this? None. The only 
reason he has to get up there and tell you that this happened is 
because it's the truth. He swore to tell the truth and he did. And, like 
it or not, this is how it happened. 
(Tr., p.776, L.20 - p.777, L.6 (emphasis added).) 
Now, counsel implies that Eli Martinez came in today and talked 
about moving Ms. Anderes into that office, apparently, as a fabrication to 
backup what Ms. Barrera said. If Eli Martinez was willing to come in here 
and tell you a lie, wouldn't he have just told you that he saw her pounding 
her head on the desk too? He tells you that he had limited access with 
her when she's in that room because he went off to go make phone calls 
to get police and paramedics there. If this was going to be some, you 
know, cloaks and daggers thing, where people are coming in her [sic] and 
telling you things that aren't true, why does he happened to not he there 
when she pounds her head on the desk. Because he just didn't happen to 
be there. That's the truth. And he did not come in here and say 
something that wasn't true about that because there's no motive. 
Again, what would he get out of it? Who has a motive to be less than 
truthful and who has other markers of poor credibility? The defendant. 
(Tr., p.778, L.20- p.779, L.13.) 
Ms. Anderes again reiterates that she is not asserting that the State cannot 
discuss credibility and does not object to the majority of the argument. However, she 
maintains that the comments by the prosecution crossed the line and amounted to more 
than a fair comment on the evidence or inferences to be drawn there from. Instead, 
they were attempts to characterize Ms. Anderes as an individual that could not be 
believed under any circumstances - a liar and to bolster the credibility of the State's 
witnesses. The comments did not merely present conflicting evidence and ask the jury 
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to own conclusions, but told the jury the conclusions that they must 
they were the conclusions of the prosecutor. 
It is a violation of Ms. Anderes' Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial to have 
a jury reach its decision on any factor other than the evidence admitted at trial and the 
law as explained in the jury instructions. In this case, misconduct related to the 
prosecution expressing opinions regarding Ms. Anderes' credibility, disparaging her to 
the jury, and bolstering the credibility of the State's witnesses interfered with the jury's 
ability to make an impartial decision, thereby interfering with Ms. Anderes' Sixth 
Amendment right to an impartial jury. As such, the misconduct in this case clearly 
violates her unwaived constitutional rights and deprived her of her right to a fair trial. As 
such, this Court must vacate the conviction. 
2. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Related To Vouching For Prosecution 
Witnesses And Calling Ms. Anderes A Liar Are Reviewable As 
Fundamental Error 
Prosecutorial vouching for the credibility of a witness either through bolstering or 
undermining credibility is not merely an evidentiary issue as it is when a witness 
provides vouching testimony. Instead, it is a distinct form of prosecutorial misconduct 
that implicates a constitutional right. 
First, it is a violation of Ms. Anderes Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial to 
have a jury reach its decision on any factor other than the evidence admitted at trial and 
the law as explained in the jury instructions. As such, prosecutorial misconduct, in 
general, directly violates a constitutional right. It should be noted that the Idaho 
Supreme Court stated in Perry that, "Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict 
on any factor other than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence 
admitted during trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that 
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1 
this 
Idaho 
a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial." Perry, 
This is an implicit recognition by the Idaho Supreme Court that 
prosecutorial misconduct claims are connected to a constitutional provision. 
In this case, the misconduct also interfered with the jury's ability to make 
credibility determinations. The State violated Ms. Anderes' right to a jury trial when the 
prosecutor attempted to encroach upon the jury's vital and exclusive function to make 
credibility determinations. "The right to a jury trial contained in the Sixth Amendment 
... includes the right to have the jury be 'the sole judge of the weight of the testimony."' 
State v. Elmore, 154 Wash. App. 885, 228 P.3d 760 (WA 2010) (quoting State v. Lane, 
1 Wash.2d 825, 838, 889 P.2d (V\/A 1995) (quoting State v. Crotts, Wash. 
250-51, 60 403 (1900)). 
Additionally, the Idaho Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, recently held 
that "unlike the elicitation of an opinion from a lay witness in regard to credibility, 
vouching by a prosecutor implicates a constitutional right." State v. Anderson, Supreme 
Court Docket Number 39227, Idaho Court of Appeals, 2013 Unpublished Opinion 
No.805 (December 30, 2013)1. While this case is not binding authority, it is limitedly 
persuasive on the issue of whether the type of misconduct prevalent in the case at hand 
deals with a constitutional right, not merely an evidentiary issue. 
The misconduct in this case not only involved Ms. Anderes' state and federal 
constitutional rights to due process, but also her federal and state constitutional rights to 
1 Ms. Anderes recognizes that this is an unpublished opinion and is not to be cited as 
authority because it is neither case law nor binding precedent. See Internal Rule Of 
The Idaho Supreme Court 15(f) ("If an opinion is not published, it may not be cited as 
authority or precedent in any court."). Accordingly, Ms. Anderes is only citing to this 
case as an example of how the Idaho Court of Appeals has dealt with this argument in 
the past. 
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a jury trial. such, the errors involve unwaived constitutional right and are 
for fundamental error. The error in this case plainly from the record 
and no additional information is necessary. The record in this case suggests no reason 
to conclude that defense counsel elected, as a matter of trial strategy, to waive any 
objection when the prosecution vouched for the State's witnesses or disparaged the 
veracity of Ms. Anderes. Further, it cannot be a tactical decision on the part of the 
defense to have a jury reach a verdict, not based on the evidence and law, but based 
on impermissible grounds presented through misconduct. As such, the first two prongs 
of the Perry test are satisfied. 
3. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Requires Vacation Of The Conviction 
Neither misconduct objected to nor misconduct constituting fundamental error, 
will require vacating a conviction, unless the errors were not harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. See State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 471 (2007); see also 
State v. Field, 144 Idaho at 571. The prosecutorial misconduct requires vacation of the 
conviction because it cannot be said that it did not affect the outcome of the trial. In the 
case at hand, the prosecution unabashedly referred to Ms. Anderes as a liar and 
encouraged the jury to find only its witnesses credible based upon the prosecutor's 
personal belief, not just upon the evidence and inferences there from. The 
prosecution's misconduct encouraged the jury to disregard their exclusive role as the 
judges of credibility in favor of the prosecutor's beliefs regarding credibility. 
This is a case that largely hinges on credibility. One of the primary jury questions 
is whether Ms. Anderes ran into Officer Kightlinger or whether she attempted to run past 
him and he initiated contact by grabbing and tackling her. Only Officer Kightlinger and 
Ms. Anderes were present when the initial struggle began and no other witnesses were 
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testify about the initial contact. ( See general/ Tr.) Robert Kightlinger, the 
victim, testified that he was watching Ms. Anderes for her parole officer; that 
gathered her things; he told her to leave them in the chair, face the wall, and put her 
hands behind her back; she complied for a moment, then turned, grabbed her things 
and charged at him. (Tr., p.391, L. 17 - p.393, L.7.) He stated that Ms. Anderes 
sprinted toward him, put her head down and ran into his chest, spinning him out into the 
hall. (Tr., p.395, Ls.1-23.) He then began struggling with her to get her into custody, 
moving against a wall and falling to the ground. (Tr., p.396, Ls.1-23.) 
Ms. Anderes testified that she placed her items on the ground as requested and 
then she started to put her hands behind her back, but then changed her mind, scooped 
up her belongings and ran towards the door. (Tr., p.570, L.14 - p.574, L.9.) At this 
time, Officer Kightlinger was parallel with her backing up toward the door, saying 
"Whoa, Whoa, Whoa." (Tr., p.574, Ls.5-18.) She stated that she did not run into Officer 
Kightlinger, that he was running along side her, when she almost got out the door, the 
officer grabbed her and tackled her to the ground. (Tr., p.576, L.5 - p.577, L.16.) 
The two versions of testimony force the jury to make a critical credibility 
determination. Other that the testimony about what occurred from Officer Kightlinger 
and Ms. Anderes, there was no additional evidence regarding the initial contact. Officer 
Kightlinger's injuries cannot corroborate either version of events specifically because he 
could have been injured in the same way regardless of how the initial contact occurred. 
Furthermore, it was unclear from the conflicting testimony if Ms. Anderes was 
kicking Officer Kightlinger because the state's own witnesses disagreed about the 
struggle that ensued after the initial contact. Christopher Phillips testified that he 
responded to a call for help, found Officer Kightlinger on the ground on top of 
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who was "laying on the ground" and struggling a little bit, "not much." 
(Tr., , L.14 L.10.) Elias Martinez testified that when he came upon Officer 
Kightlinger and Ms. Anderes they were on the floor and Ms. Anderes was struggling, 
kicking, and flopping, so he restrained her legs. (Tr., p.650, L.4 - p.651, L.10.) 
As such, under either theory for the battery, the jury had to make critical 
credibility determinations and the prosecutorial misconduct could have swayed the jury 
in making these determinations. This Court should find that the misconduct denied 
Ms. Anderes her right to a fair trial because it cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt 
that misconduct did not contribute to the verdict. In reviewing the trial as a whole, the 
prosecutor's improper comments, constituting misconduct, likely influenced the jury. 
4. Even If The Above Errors Are Harmless, The Accumulation Of The 
Prosecutorial Misconduct Amounts To Cumulative Error 
Ms. Anderes asserts that the prosecutorial misconduct errors which occurred 
throughout her closing were not individually harmless. However, assuming arguendo 
that this Court finds that they were, the accumulation of the errors and irregularities that 
took place negated her right to a fair trial and, thus, mandate reversal and a new trial. 
Ms. Anderes asserts that if this Court finds that more than one of the asserted, 
unpreserved, instances of prosecutorial misconduct is found to be fundamental error 
that these errors can then be reviewed for cumulative error for the purposes of 
determining if the prosecutor was engaging in a pattern of misbehavior. State v. 
Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 70-71 (2011 ). Recently, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that 
when ruling on a motion for mistrial brought after an instance of alleged prosecutorial 
misconduct, the district court should not limit its view of the misconduct to the specific 
isolated incident, but should also take into consideration whether or not the prosecutor 
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is engaging in a pattern of misbehavior. Id. "Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a 
of errors, harmless in and of themselves, may in the aggregate show the 
absence of a fair trial. However, a necessary predicate to the application of the doctrine 
is a finding of more than one error." Perry, 150 Idaho at 230. 
Ms. Anderes asserts that given the multiple instances of prosecutorial 
misconduct, it is likely that even if each of the instances individually did not amount to 
reversible error, the accumulation of the misconduct including calling Ms. Anderes a liar 
and vouching for the prosecution witnesses, influenced the jury and deprived 
Ms. Anderes of her right to a fair trial. 
11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Ordered Restitution For A Portion Of 
Mr. Kightlinger's Surgery Which Repaired Damage That Was Not Proven To Have Been 
Caused By Ms. Anderes And In Ordering Restitution For A Pair Of Sunglasses That The 
State Failed To Prove Were Damaged Or Destroyed As A Result Of Ms. Anderes' 
Criminal Actions 
A. Introduction 
During his surgery for damage to his shoulder that allegedly occurred when 
Ms. Anderes allegedly battered Officer Kightlinger, the doctor also preformed some 
work related to his joint, presumably related to his bone spurring and the calcification of 
his joint or arthritis caused by prior injuries. Ms. Anderes asserts that Mr. Kightlinger's 
arthritis was not caused by the battery and, as such, she should not have been ordered 
to pay for the costs of the surgery related to addressing these issues. 
Furthermore, Ms. Anderes asserts that the State failed to present sufficient 
evidence that Mr. Kightlinger's sun glasses were damaged in the altercation and that, as 
a result, she should not have to pay for the costs of replacement. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
decision to order restitution, and in what amount, is within the 
discretion of a district court State v. Lombard, 149 Idaho 819, 822 (Ct. App. 2010). In 
reviewing the trial court's exercise of discretion, this Court must determine whether the 
trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one involving the exercise of discretion; 
(2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with any legal 
standards applicable to specific choices it had; and (3) reached its decision by an 
exercise of reason. State v. Olpin, 140 Idaho 377, 378 (Ct. App. 2004). 
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Ordered Restitution For A 
Portion Of Mr. Kightlinger's Surgery Which Repaired Damage That Was Not 
Proven To Have Been Caused By Ms. Anderes Actions And In Ordering 
Restitution For A Pair Of Sunglasses That The State Failed To Prove Were 
Damaged Or Destroyed As A Result Of Ms. Anderes' Criminal Actions 
The decision whether to order restitution, and in what amount, is within the 
discretion of a district court, guided by consideration of the factors set forth in I.C. § 19-
5304(7) and by the policy favoring full compensation to crime victims who suffer 
economic loss. State v. Lombard, 149 Idaho 819, 822 (Ct. App. 2010). "Idaho Code 
Section 19-5304(6) provides that determination of economic loss is based upon the civil 
preponderance of evidence standard," and "the amount of the award must be supported 
by substantial evidence." In re Doe, 146 Idaho 277, 284 (Ct. App. 2008) (citations 
omitted). A trial "court's power to order restitution is limited to that provided by the 
statute." State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 887 (2013). The State has the burden of 
proving the amount of restitution. State v. Nienburg, 153 Idaho 491, 497-498 (Ct. App. 
2012). 
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1. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Ordered Restitution For A 
Portion Of Mr. Kightlinger's Surgery Which Repaired Damage That Was 
Not Proven To Have Been Caused By Ms. Anderes 
Ms. Anderes does not challenge that a majority of the restitution ordered was 
done so properly. However, she asserts that a portion of Mr. Kightlinger's shoulder 
surgery was completed to address arthritis issues including calcification and bone 
spurring. Ms. Anderes asserts that the district court abused its discretion in ordering 
restitution for the entire surgery and not merely the portions necessary to address the 
physical injuries that were the result of the alleged battery. 
Idaho Code§ 19-5304(1 )(a) provides: 
"Economic loss" includes, but is not limited to, the value of the property 
taken, destroyed broken, or otherwise harmed, lost wages, and direct out-
of-pocket losses or expenses, such as medical expenses resulting from 
the criminal conduct, but does not include less tangible damages such as 
pain and suffering, wrongful death or emotional distress. 
I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(a) (emphasis added). In Card, the Court of Appeals explained, "[l]t is 
evident that under the restitution statute, a crime must 'result' in an economic loss in 
order for restitution to be awarded," and that "where treatment expenses are sought, the 
State bears the initial burden to make a prima facie showing ... that the expenses were 
reasonable and necessary to treat injuries caused by the defendant's criminal conduct." 
State v. Card, 146 Idaho 111, 114-115 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing In re Doe). In 
addressing the plain language of the restitution statute, the Idaho Supreme Court noted, 
"Medical expenses are expressly included in the definition for economic loss in 
I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(a) if they are a direct result of the criminal conduct." Straub, 153 
Idaho at 890 (emphasis added). 
From the beginning of treatment for Mr. Kightlinger's shoulder injury, doctors 
noted that there was prior damage and new damage. Dr. Gregory Schweiger saw 
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Mr. Kightlinger, examined his shoulder, and took x-rays. (PSI, p.78.) 2 Dr. Schweiger 
that Mr. Kightlinger had a prominence at his right acromioclavicular joint and his 
joint was tender. (PSI, p.78.) There were not abnormalities in the shoulder noted. 
(PSI, p.78.) Mr. Kightlinger denied any previous injuries. (PSI, p.78.) The x-rays 
showed that the joint had a prominent bone on the acromial and clavicular aspects 
where there was chronic calcifications from previous injuries. 
Dr. Schweiger ordered an MRI for further evaluation. (PSI, p.78.) 
(PSI, p. 78.) 
The MRI revealed that there was tearing of the superios glenoid labrum, 
tendinopathy of the distal supraspinatus, and mild acromioclavical joint degenerative 
change. (PSI, p.84.) Dr. Tadje again listed his impressions as right shoulder 
impingement, labral tear and acromioclavicular arthritis. (R., p.86.) Dr. Tadje 
interpreted the MRI as showing "a significant labral tear and some partial thickness 
tearing/inflammation of the rotator cuff." (PSI, p.86.) Later, Dr. Jared Tadje noted that 
Mr. Kightlinger's shoulder pain was likely caused by impingement, a labral tear, and 
acromioclavicular joint arthritis. (PSI, pp.76-77.) He recommended surgery. (PSI, 
p.86.) 
During the surgery, Dr. Tadje found extensive labral tearing and repaired the 
tearing, reattaching the labrum to the glenoid. (PSI, p.87.) He then worked on the 
subacromial space which had "quite a bit of bursa! inflammation" and need to have the 
soft tissue removed and smoothed out. (PSI, p.87.) Finally, Dr. Tadje began to work on 
2 At the restitution hearing, the district court considered several pages of medical 
records. (Tr., p.802, L.19 - p.804, L.22.) These documents were attached to the PSI 
and considered pages 52-68. (Tr., p.803, Ls.8-13.) These documents are contained in 
the electronic copy of the PSI and are electronic pages 74 - 90. For ease of reference, 
the electronic file for the PSI and attachments will be cited as "PSI" and the pages 
citation will reference the electronic page number. 
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the AC joint which had "significant bone spurring" and narrowing. (PSI, p.87.) He 
"brought a bur in and removed the distal portion of the clavicle." (PSI, p.87.) He then 
removed the arthroscope and closed the portals. (PSI, p.87.) 
Ms. Anderes asserts that the State failed to prove that her criminal actions were 
the cause3 of Mr. Kightlinger's arthritis, bone spurring, or the calcification of his AC joint. 
Certainly, it is reasonable to believe, based upon common logic and the medical 
reports, that Mr. Kightlinger did not develop arthritis overnight as result of the alleged 
battery. Ms. Anderes asserts that ordering her to pay restitution to correct or alleviate 
arthritis related issues is akin to ordering an individual to pay for the cancer treatment of 
a victim whose cancer is discovered in the process of treatment for an injury cased in a 
criminal act. Just because the two medical issues involve the same physical area of the 
body does not mean the two have the same cause or that a defendant is required to pay 
for the additional treatment. 
3 Ms. Anderes asserts that the alleged battery was not the actual or proximate 
cause of Mr. Kightlinger's shoulder issues related to arthritis, bone spurring, or 
calcification. Recently, the Idaho Supreme Court rearticulated the causations 
standards. See State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599 (2011 ). Corbus stated the following: 
As articulated by this Court in Lampien, causation consists of actual 
cause and true proximate cause. Lampien, 148 Idaho at 374, 223 P.3d at 
757. "Actual cause is the factual question of whether a particular event 
produced a particular consequence." Id. (quoting Cramer, 146 Idaho at 
875, 204 P.3d at 515). The "but for" test is used in circumstances where 
there is only one actual cause or where two or more possible causes were 
not acting concurrently. Id. On the other hand, true proximate cause 
deals with "whether it was reasonably foreseeable that such harm would 
flow from the negligent conduct." Id. (quoting Cramer, 146 Idaho at 875, 
204 P.3d at 515). In analyzing proximate cause, this Court must 
determine whether the injury and manner of occurrence are so highly 
unusual "that a reasonable person, making an inventory of the possibilities 
of harm which his conduct might produce, would not have reasonably 
expected the injury to occur." Id. (quoting Cramer, 146 Idaho at 875, 204 
P.3d at 515). 
Id. at 602-603. 
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While Ms. Anderes admits that the district court can order restitution for the 
a pre-existing condition, in the case hand, the State provided no 
evidence that the pain suffered by Mr. Kightlinger was the result of an aggravation of his 
arthritis and not the result of the labral tear. See Blaine v. Byers, 91 Idaho 665, 674 
(1967) ("The trial court by its instruction No. 16 correctly advised the jury that 
respondent was entitled to recover damages for disability resulting from the aggravation 
of a pre-existing condition, but was not entitled to recover for any disability which 
respondent may now be suffering which was not caused or contributed to by reason of 
the accident."); see also IDJI 9.02 (Aggravation of Pre-Existing Condition). As such, 
she that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to order her to pay for 
the entirely of the surgery. She requests that her case be remanded for a determination 
as to what costs of the surgery are attributable to her criminal acts and which portions 
are attributable to the correction of a pre-existing condition. 
2. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Ordered Restitution For A 
Pair Of Sunglasses That The State Failed To Prove Were Damaged Or 
Destroyed As A Result Of Ms. Anderes Criminal Actions 
Ms. Anderes asserts that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that 
Mr. Kightlinger's sunglasses were damaged or destroyed during the alleged battery. At 
the restitution hearing, the State presented the following information regarding the 
sunglasses: 
Q. And, then, in addition to the costs associated with your travel, did 
you have a financial loss based on the loss of a pair of Oakley 
sunglasses? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you know the market cost of those sunglasses when they 
were damaged? 
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And what was that? 
A. I think it was $180. 
(Tr., p.816, L.20 - p.817, L.3.) 
The questioning implied that Officer Kightlinger lost a pair of sunglasses, but did 
not ask how or when they were lost. Later, the State asked a question which 
presupposed that the sunglasses had been "damaged" not lost. It is unclear if the 
sunglasses were destroyed or lost because the State failed to examine Mr. Kightlinger 
on the issue. More importantly, the State did not present any evidence that the 
sunglasses were lost or damaged as a result of Ms. Anderes' actions. Additionally, the 
State failed to present sufficient evidence regarding the cost of the sunglasses. While 
Mr. Kightlinger's memory of the cost may be sufficient, his non-committal answer that he 
thought it was about $180 is insufficient to prove the cost. 
The State failed to present any evidence, let alone substantial and competent 
evidence, that the sunglasses were damaged during the battery or as a result of the 
battery. As such, it was an abuse of the district court to order restitution for the 
sunglasses. 
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CONCLUSION 
Ms. respectfully requests that her felony conviction be vacated and her 
case remanded for a new trial. Additionally, she requests that her restitution order be 
vacated. She requests that her case be remanded for a new restitution hearing for the 
limited purpose of determining what portion of the cost of the shoulder surgery she is 
responsible. 
DATED this 22nd day of August, 2014. 
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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